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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

The United States Constitution and the Minnesota State
2
Constitution prohibit the deprivation of life, liberty, or property at
the hands of the government without due process of law. While a
license to drive is not a right, the United States Supreme Court and
the Minnesota Supreme Court have concluded that “[a] license to
3
drive is an important property interest.” “Once licenses are issued
. . . their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit
of a livelihood . . . . In such cases the licenses are not to be taken
away without that procedural due process required by the
4
Fourteenth Amendment.” In Minnesota, drivers who either refuse
to submit to a test of their alcohol content or who test over the
5
limit have their driver’s licenses revoked by the peace officer who
6
This process, known as a pre-hearing
handled their arrest.
revocation, allows for this revocation without any finding by a court
7
of law. The law allowing this practice is the implied consent law.
This analysis of the constitutionality of Minnesota’s prehearing revocation scheme begins by explaining the mechanics of
8
Minnesota’s implied consent statute. Because the United States
Supreme Court has established minimum procedural due process

1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
3. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
4. Id.
5. “It is a crime for any person to drive . . . any motor vehicle . . . when the
person’s [blood alcohol content] is .10 or more.” MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 subd. 1(5)
(2004). In August of 2005 the limit will be lowered to .08. 2004 Minn. Laws 283.
6. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subd. 3 (2004).
7. Id. § 169A.51.
8. Infra part II.
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protections that must be afforded drivers, this backdrop is
9
examined. After considering the federal standards for procedural
due process, the numerous changes to Minnesota’s implied
10
consent statute will be addressed. Next, the current challenge will
be discussed, including the factual basis for the challenge, the
arguments for the statute’s unconstitutionality, and the district
11
court’s decision. Finally, this note will conclude that, given the
dramatic increase in the private interest at stake and the complete
lack of any procedural due process protections, Minnesota’s
12
current pre-hearing revocation scheme is unconstitutional.
II. THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW
A. Language of Implied Consent
Drivers arrested for drunk driving are subject to two separate
penalty schemes. There are criminal penalties associated with
13
“driving while impaired” (DWI). The DWI laws make it illegal per
se to operate a motor vehicle if a person has an alcohol
14
Alcohol
concentration at or above a particular level.
15
16
concentration can be measured by a breath test, urine test, or
17
blood test. In addition to criminal penalties, a driver arrested for
drunk driving is subject to the penalties provided for in the implied
consent statute. The implied consent statute is civil in nature, and
therefore imposes a separate and distinct set of penalties or
18
consequences upon the driver. Because there are two systems, the
driver is subject to two proceedings; the implied consent
proceeding only deals with the civil penalty, the revocation of the

9. Infra part III.
10. Infra part IV.
11. Infra part V.
12. Infra part VI.
13. MINN. STAT. § 169A.01 (2004).
14. Id. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5).
15. Id. § 169A.51, subd. 3. When a breath test is used, the measure is “the
number of grams per 210 liters of breath.” Id. § 169A.03, subd, 2(2).
16. Id. § 169A.51, subd. 3. In a urine test, “’[a]lcohol concentration’ means
. . . the number of grams of alcohol per 67 milliliters . . . .” Id. § 169A.03, subd.
2(3).
17. Id. § 169A.51, subd. 3. “‘Alcohol concentration’ means the number of
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.” Id. § 169A.03, subd. 2(1).
18. DONALD H. NICHOLS, THE DRINKING DRIVER IN MINNESOTA § 3.01 (5th ed.
2004).
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19

driver’s license.
While these criminal and civil systems have
become intertwined, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that
the significant civil implied consent penalties “[do] not render the
20
implied consent law punitive.”
Drunk driving statutes, both civil and criminal, use specialized
terms. These terms vary between the states. Minnesota has a civil
21
system based on implied consent. “Implied consent” technically
refers to the consent that every driver of a motor vehicle gives to
the state to be tested for alcohol or controlled or hazardous
substances in exchange for being granted a license to operate a
22
The term “implied consent” is used by
motor vehicle.
practitioners when referring to Minnesota’s administrative license
23
revocation process.
To avoid confusion, Minnesota’s
administrative license revocation scheme will be referred to as
“implied consent.” A revocation under that scheme will be
referred to as an “administrative revocation.”
B. Purpose of Implied Consent
The purpose of implied consent laws is to reduce the
incidence of drunk driving and the corresponding threat thereby
caused to public safety. According to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), administrative license revocation
24
laws serve two purposes. First, they allow for swift revocation of
25
26
the driver’s license. Second, they are a “successful deterrent.”
“Studies have indicated that administrative per se license
suspension is . . . perceived by drivers as having the highest severity,
certainty, and swiftness of all DUI sanctions, including jail and
27
fines, thereby increasing the deterrence.” The deterrent effect is
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 517 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. 1993)).
The Davis court specifically considered the amount of the license revocation fee,
which was $250.00 in 1993. Id. The current license revocation fee is $680.00. In
addition, the civil penalty can now be used to enhance criminal offenses. See
discussion infra parts IV.B., V.B.2.b.
21. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subd. 1 (2004).
22. Id.
23. Administrative License Revocation, 2 TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1 (Mar. 2004),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/new-Fact-Sheet03/factsheet04/laws-ALR.pdf (last visited on April 14, 2005).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Kerry G. Wangberg, Administrative Driver’s License Suspension, ARIZ. LAWYER,
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linked to the publicity of the law, so that drivers know and
28
understand the consequences of their actions. As of December
2003, forty-one states had “some form of administrative license
29
revocation.”
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) rates every state on
30
various factors surrounding its DWI laws. One of the nine factors
31
According to MADD,
considered is “administrative measures.”
“[r]esearch and experience have shown that a system of
progressively severe administrative penalties . . . deters individuals
32
from driving after drinking and affect repeat offenders.” These
administrative penalties include administrative license revocation,
“which protects the public by removing offenders from the
33
highways as quickly as possible.” In Minnesota, after drivers have
had their licenses administratively revoked, they receive a seven-day
34
temporary permit to “get their affairs in order.” Accordingly, a
driver who qualifies for an administrative revocation is not
immediately “off the streets.” In 2002, MADD gave Minnesota an
35
overall grade of B- in its report.
Minnesota’s grade for
36
administrative measures, however, was a B+. Minnesota’s implied
37
According to MADD, the
consent law is listed as a strength.

Dec. 1988, at 29.
28. Administrative License Revocation, supra note 23, at 2.
29. Id.
These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
30. MADD, Rating the States (2002), at http://www.madd.org/docs/rts2002/
rts section1.pdf (last visited on April 14, 2005).
31. Id. The other factors are 1) state political leadership; 2) alcohol content
testing; 3) state law enforcement programs; 4) underage drinking and drinking
and driving control; 5) victim’s issues; 6) criminal justice system; 7) resource
allocation; and 8) innovative state programs. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Other administrative measures include a .08 blood alcohol content
limit, vehicle sanctions, mandatory assessment, primary seat belt laws, and lower
alcohol limits for convicted offenders. Id. Vehicle sanctions include “alcohol
ignition interlock devices, impoundment, confiscation, and forfeiture.” Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Other administrative strengths include: license plate confiscations,
vehicle impoundment/immobilizations, vehicle confiscation/forfeiture, and the
fact that refusing an alcohol content test is a crime. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 5
SHERIDANBURKHART BOOTH.DOC

1466

4/17/2005 2:27:10 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:4

implied consent law is strong because a “[r]equest for [an
administrative license revocation] hearing does not delay license
38
suspension.” In addition, an administrative suspension counts as
39
a prior DWI offense.
C. Implied Consent Procedure
1.

Authorization for the Test
40

Every driver who operates a motor vehicle in Minnesota
consents to testing for “determining the presence of alcohol,
41
controlled substances, or hazardous substances.” There are three
42
means of testing: blood, breath, or urine. A peace officer can
require a driver to take such a test if two criteria are met. First, the
peace officer must have “probable cause to believe the person was
driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle” while
43
impaired.
Second, one of the following four factors must be
44
present: (1) a lawful arrest for driving while impaired; (2) an
45
accident that caused death, personal injury, or property damage;
46
(3) a refusal of a preliminary screening test; or (4) the
47
preliminary screening test yielded a result above 0.10.
When a peace officer gives an implied consent test, she must
inform the driver that Minnesota law requires submission to the
48
test. The peace officer must explain why Minnesota requires the
49
test. The peace officer must tell the driver that refusal to take the
50
test is a crime. The peace officer must inform the driver that if
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. “‘Motor Vehicle’ means every vehicle that is self-propelled and every
vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires.
The term includes motorboats in operation and off-road recreational vehicles, but
does not include a vehicle moved solely by human power.” MINN. STAT. § 169A.03,
subd. 15 (2004). This article will focus on automobiles.
41. Id. § 169A.51, subd. 1(a).
42. Id.
43. Id., subd. 1(b).
44. Id., subd. 1(b)(1).
45. Id., subd. 1(b)(2).
46. Id., subd. 1(b)(3).
47. Id., subd. 1(b)(4) (to be amended 2005). On August 1, 2005, the limit
will decrease to 0.08. Id.
48. Id., subd. 2(1).
49. Id., subd. 2(1)(i)–(iii); see infra part II.A.
50. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subd. 2(2) (2004).
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she has probable cause to believe that “the criminal vehicular
homicide and injury laws” have been violated, “a test will be taken
51
with or without the person’s consent.” Finally, the peace officer
must tell the driver that she has a limited time to contact an
52
attorney before making the decision about testing.
53
The peace officer decides which type of test is used.
However, if the driver refuses to take a blood or urine test, that
54
person must be offered an alternative test. If a driver passes the
breath test, a blood or urine test can be required “if there is
probable cause to believe that: (1) there is impairment by a
controlled substance or hazardous substance that is not subject to
testing by a breath test; or (2) a controlled substance listed in
55
schedule I or II . . . is present . . . .” If a person is “incapable of
56
refusal,” a test may be given.
2.

Administration of the Test
57

The preferred method of testing is breath testing. When a
peace officer brings a suspected drunk driver in for a breath test,
58
she must follow a very specific procedure. The driver must be
59
observed for at least fifteen minutes before she is given the test.
This observation ensures that any alcohol stored in the mouth and
60
nasal passages dissipates.
After the observation period is
61
completed, the peace officer performs the breath test.
The statute requires the use of an “approved breath-testing
62
63
instrument.” Minnesota uses the Intoxilyzer Model 5000. “The
51. Id., subd. 2(3).
52. Id., subd. 2(4). The “right is limited to the extent that it cannot
unreasonably delay administration of the test.” Id.
53. Id., subd. 3 (to be amended 2005).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id., subd. 6.
57. The peace officer can decide to use a blood or urine test instead. Id. at
subd. 3. If the driver refuses a blood or urine test, they must be offered an
alternative test. Id.
58. NICHOLS, supra note 18, § 9.06.
59. Id.
60. Id. “The lining of the mouth and nasal passages stores alcohol for some
time after a person consumes alcohol. Normal processes eliminate residual mouth
alcohol within fifteen minutes.” Id.
61. Id.
62. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subd. 5 (2004). The instrument must be “an
infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument . . . .” Id. at subd. 5(a). The
test must consist of three parts: “one adequate breath-sample analysis, one control
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Intoxilyzer Model 5000 is . . . considered to be the state-of-the-art
64
means to measure breath samples.” Before administering the test,
65
the peace officer inserts “a new mouthpiece into the breath tube.”
After starting the Intoxilyzer, “the subject has four (4) minutes to
66
deliver an adequate breath sample.” The driver is then instructed
“to take a deep breath and exhale into the mouthpiece of the
67
instrument.”
A tone sounds when the driver blows into the
instrument; the driver is instructed to continue blowing until the
68
tone stops. “The instrument checks minimum flow rate, sample
volume, and level slope of the sample. To meet these criteria, it
may be necessary to have the driver continue to blow for about
69
seven seconds.”
If the driver does not provide an adequate
sample within four minutes of the start of the test, a message stating
70
“insufficient sample” will appear on the instrument. Providing an
71
insufficient sample is considered refusal.
3.

Penalties for Test Failure or Refusal

The penalties for refusing to take or failing an implied consent
72
test are severe. If the driver refuses to take the test, but the peace
officer has probable cause to believe the driver was involved in a
vehicular homicide, “a test may be required and obtained despite
73
the person’s refusal.”
If a driver refuses to take an implied consent test and the
peace officer certifies “that there existed probable cause to believe
the person had been driving, operating, or in physical control of a
analysis, and a second, adequate breath-sample analysis.” Id.
63. Nichols, supra note 18, § 9.01.
64. Id. § 9.05.
65. OPERATOR’S MANUAL, INTOXILYZER 5000 3–4 (1999).
66. Nichols, supra note 18, § 9.02.
67. OPERATOR’S MANUAL, INTOXILYZER 5000 3–4 (1999).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subd. 5; Anderson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 441
N.W.2d 126, 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
72. Test failure includes: (1) “an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more; (2)
an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more, if the person was driving, operating, or
in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle at the time of the violation; or
(3) the presence of a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II, other than
marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols.” MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subd. 2 (2004).
Effective August 1, 2005, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more will constitute
test failure. Id.
73. Id., subd. 1.
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motor vehicle . . .” while impaired, the individual’s driver’s license
74
will be revoked for one year. The revocation period for a test
75
failure varies based on several factors. The base revocation, for
drivers with no prior incidents and no enhancing factors, is ninety
76
days. If the driver is under twenty-one years old, their license is
77
revoked for six months.
If the driver has a “qualified prior
impaired driving incident” in the previous ten years, the revocation
78
period is 180 days. Finally, if the driver’s alcohol content is 0.20
79
or greater, each revocation period is doubled.
When a driver refuses to take an alcohol content test or fails
the test, the peace officer has the authorization to immediately
80
revoke the individual’s driver’s license. After revocation, drivers
are issued a seven-day temporary license to “get their affairs in
81
order.” If it is the driver’s first offense, the driver may request a
82
limited license (work permit) after fifteen days.
4.

Review Options and Procedures

A driver may challenge her revocation in two ways. First, a
83
driver can request an administrative review. Second, the driver
84
The request for an administrative
can request judicial review.
85
review “has no effect upon the availability of judicial review . . . .”
An administrative review can be requested at any time during the
86
After an administrative review has been
revocation period.
requested, the commissioner has fifteen days to respond in

74. Id., subd. 3(a).
75. Id., subd. 4(a).
76. Id., subd. 4(a)(1).
77. Id., subd. 4(a)(2).
78. Id. at subd. 4(a)(3). A “‘[q]ualified prior impaired driving incident’
includes prior impaired driving convictions and prior impaired driving-related
losses of license.” Id. § 169A.03, subd. 22.
79. Id., subd. 4(a)(4). For example, if a driver who was under twenty-one had
a blood alcohol content of 0.20 or more, their revocation period would be one
year. See id., subd. 4. A driver with no ‘qualified prior impaired driving incidents’
within the past ten years who tested above a 0.20 would have their license revoked
for 180 days. See id.
80. Id., subds. 6, 7; see infra part II.B.
81. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subd. 6(c)(2), 7(c)(2) (2004).
82. Id. § 171.30.
83. Id. § 169A.53, subd. 1(a).
84. Id., subd. 2.
85. Id., subd. 1(b).
86. Id., subd. 1(a).
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87

writing.
A request for judicial review must be made within thirty days of
the driver receiving “a notice and order of revocation or
88
disqualification . . . .”
This time limit is jurisdictional; if the
request is not served and filed within thirty days, the court cannot
89
hear the petition. The commissioner does not have to respond to
90
the petition and is not charged court fees.
According to the implied consent statute, judicial reviews are
limited to ten issues: (1) “did the peace officer have probable cause
to believe the person was driving . . . a motor vehicle . . . in
violation of section 169A.20 . . . ?”; (2) was the driver legally placed
under arrest for the violation?; (3) was there an accident causing
property damage or physical injury, including death?; (4) did the
driver refuse the preliminary breath test?; (5) were the alcohol
concentration test results over the limit (0.10)?; (6) was the driver
informed of their rights and consequences of “taking or refusing
the test . . . ?”; (7) did the driver refuse to take the alcohol
concentration test?; (8) did the results of the alcohol concentration
test show an alcohol concentration over 0.10 or “the presence of a
controlled substance listed in schedule I or II . . . ?”; (9) if a
commercial vehicle was involved, were the results of the alcohol
concentration test over 0.04?; and (10) “[w]as the testing method
used valid and reliable and were the test results accurately
91
evaluated?” After the judicial review, the court must either sustain
92
The decision of the judge may be
or rescind the revocation.
93
appealed through the rules of appellate procedure.
An implied consent revocation qualifies as a prior impaired
94
driving incident. When calculating civil and criminal penalties for
DWIs, a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the past
95
ten years is an aggravating factor.
Accordingly, an implied

87. Id.
88. Id., subd. 2(a).
89. See, e.g., Plocher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 681 N.W.2d 698, 701 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing McShane v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 377 N.W.2d 479, 481
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) rev. denied Jan. 23, 1986) (stating that “[t]imely filing is a
jurisdictional requirement.”).
90. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subd. 2(a) (2004).
91. Id., subd. 3(b).
92. Id., subd. 3(e).
93. Id., subd. 3(f).
94. Id. § 169A.03, subd. 22.
95. See id. § 169A.20–.275.
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consent revocation can be used to enhance the criminal penalties
for subsequent DWIs.
In 2001, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that judicial
review of an implied consent revocation will collaterally estop the
state from relitigating any issue decided against it in the implied
96
consent hearing. The court held that collateral estoppel applied
when three facts were present: (1) the issues are identical; (2) there
97
is a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the parties are in privity.
The issues in an implied consent hearing and the criminal case are
98
necessarily identical.
In addition, the judge at the implied
99
consent hearing issues a final judgment on the merits. Finally, the
court of appeals held that the attorney general’s office (who
litigates the implied consent hearings) and the city attorneys (who
100
prosecute the DWI) were in privity with each other.
The court
held that, if notice of the implied consent hearing was given to the
prosecuting attorney, the state would be estopped from relitigating
101
any matter that was decided against it at that hearing.
Because
issues surrounding probable cause were often litigated at implied
consent hearings, the application of collateral estoppel would have
resulted in the dismissal of criminal cases where there had been a
finding of lack of probable cause at the companion implied
consent hearing. However, in 2002, the Minnesota legislature
legislatively overruled the court of appeals and added a clause to
the implied consent statute stating that “[t]he civil hearing . . . shall
not give rise to an estoppel on any issues arising from the same set
102
of circumstances in any criminal prosecution.”
III. FEDERAL PRE-HEARING REVOCATION DECISIONS
While implied consent revocations are widely used and serve
valid purposes, the revocation of a driver’s license without the
benefit of a judicial hearing raises procedural due process

96. State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
97. Id. at 660.
98. Id. at 662.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 661–62.
101. Id. at 664. Because of the difference in evidentiary rules and the burden
of proof, a criminal defendant is not collaterally estopped from challenging the
issue determined in the implied consent hearing at the subsequent criminal trial.
Id. at 662 n.1.
102. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subd. 3(g) (2004).
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concerns. Accordingly, pre-hearing revocation schemes have been
challenged on both a federal and state level. The federal decisions
establish the minimum level of procedural due process that must
be afforded drivers under the United States Constitution. Each
state must afford at least that much protection, but may offer
greater protection under the law or constitution of the individual
state.
103

A. Bell v. Burson

In 1971, the Supreme Court considered a Georgia pre-hearing
suspension scheme involving the suspension of driver’s licenses for
104
uninsured motorists involved in motor vehicle accidents.
Such
drivers would have their licenses suspended unless they posted
“security to cover the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved
105
parties in reports of the accident.”
While the Court recognized that a driver’s license is a
privilege, the Court stated that
[o]nce licenses are issued . . . their continued possession
may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action
that adjudicates important interests of licensees. In such
cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
106
Amendment.
The Court also stated that “[a] procedural rule that may satisfy
due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural
107
due process in every case.” Accordingly, the Bell court held that
[w]hile ‘many controversies have raged about [sic] the
Due Process Clause,’ . . . it is fundamental that except in
emergency situations (and this is not one) due process
requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest
such as that here involved, it must afford ‘notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
108
case’ before the termination becomes effective.
The Supreme Court concluded that Georgia could not revoke

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

402 U.S. 535 (1971).
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542 (internal citations omitted).
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licenses of uninsured drivers involved in motor vehicle accidents
without first having a hearing to determine if “there [was] a
reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as
109
a result of the accident.”
110

B. Mackey v. Montrym

The Supreme Court considered Massachusetts’ implied
111
consent pre-hearing revocation scheme in 1978.
Drivers who
refused to take an alcohol concentration test had their licenses
112
A driver whose license was revoked
revoked for ninety days.
could obtain an immediate hearing before the Registrar, who was
113
responsible for implementing the revocations.
This hearing
114
included all issues relevant to the basis of the revocation.
When evaluating this pre-hearing revocation scheme, the
Court used the due process balancing test laid out in Mathews v.
115
Eldridge. The test requires the balancing of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or
116
substitute procedural requirement would entail.

109. Id.
110. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
111. See id.
112. Id. at 4.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 10. Mathews v. Eldridge is the seminal procedural due process case
laying out the balancing test used to determine if the requirement of procedural
due process has been met. The issue is Mathews was “whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social
Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976). Mathews
specifically states that “some form of hearing is required before an individual is
finally deprived of a property interest,” and holds that “[t]he fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.’” Id. at 333 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)). Mathews also recognizes that “‘[d]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands’” Id. (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
116. Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
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The Court recognized that the private interest in a driver’s
license was substantial because a driver cannot be made “whole for
any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by
reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through
117
postsuspension [sic] review procedures.”
However, the Court
noted that the private interest was satisfied because the driver could
118
request an immediate hearing.
When considering the risk of erroneous deprivation, the
Montrym court held “the Due Process Clause has never been
construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an
erroneous deprivation of a protectible ‘property’ or ‘liberty’
interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of
119
error.”
In this case, the possibility of an error could be quickly
120
corrected because of the availability of an immediate hearing.
The state’s interest was the preservation of safety on the public
121
highways.
The majority found a pre-hearing revocation scheme
122
123
First, it serves as a sanction.
serves this interest in three ways.
124
Second, it encourages drivers to take the alcohol content test.
125
Finally, drunken drivers are promptly removed from the roads.
After balancing these factors, the Court held that the prehearing revocation scheme satisfied the requirements of
126
procedural due process.
This decision was largely predicated on
127
the availability of an immediate hearing before the Registrar.
128

C. Barry v. Barchi

The Supreme Court decided another pre-hearing suspension
case on the very same day as Montrym. While Montrym was a sharply
divided five-to-four decision, the Court unanimously agreed in
Barchi that a New York horse trainer’s license suspension law was
unconstitutional solely because it permitted pre-hearing suspension
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 11 (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977)).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18–19.
433 U.S. 55 (1979).
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129

of a trainer’s license without prompt post-suspension review.
In Barchi, the Court reviewed a law that allowed for the
immediate suspension of a horse trainer’s license if a horse from
130
her stable was found to have been drugged at the time of a race.
The law created a rebuttable presumption that the trainer was
131
involved in the drugging or at least negligent in not preventing it.
The law provided for a hearing on the suspension, but did not
permit the suspension to be stayed pending the hearing or provide
132
for when the hearing must be held. It also permitted the hearing
133
board thirty days after the hearing to render its decision.
The Court applied the Mathews due process test and found
that the state had a compelling government interest in “assuring
134
the integrity of the racing carried out under its auspices.”
The
Court also recognized the “substantial interest” a trainer has in
135
avoiding a suspension.
Finally, the Court determined that even
though the risk of erroneous deprivation in the procedures used to
test the horse was “not beyond error,” they were “sufficiently
136
reliable to satisfy constitutional requirements.”
Following this
analysis, the Court held that the State was entitled to impose the
137
pre-hearing suspension.
However, the Court struck down the law because it provided
no mechanism to ensure that a hearing would be held “at a
138
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” The Court noted
that the law “neither on its face nor as applied in this case, assured
a prompt disposition of the outstanding issues between Barchi and
139
the State.” Particularly troubling to the Court was the fact that it
was as “likely as not that Barchi and others subject to relatively brief
suspensions would have no opportunity to put the State to its proof
140
until they have suffered the full penalty imposed.”
The Court
held that, despite the State’s compelling interest in securing a pre-

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id. (citing Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552).
Id.
Id.
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hearing suspension, “once suspension has been imposed, the
141
trainer’s interest in a speedy resolution becomes paramount.”
IV. MINNESOTA PRE-HEARING REVOCATION
A. Pre-Hearing Revocation and Heddan v. Dirkswager

142

Prior to 1982, Minnesota had a post-hearing revocation
143
scheme.
The arresting officer issued a notice and order of
proposed revocation, and the driver received a thirty-day temporary
144
license.
The driver then had thirty days to request a judicial
145
hearing. If the driver requested a judicial hearing, the revocation
146
If the driver
was stayed until the court ruled against the driver.
did not petition for judicial review, the revocation period began at
147
the end of the thirty-day period.
“This system resulted in
approximately one request for judicial review out of every three
148
implied consent violations reported.”
In 1981, there were
149
Only 326 of these “drivers
“10,500 requests for judicial review.”
150
were able to avoid license revocation.”
In 1982, the Minnesota legislature made substantial changes to
151
the implied consent laws. These changes were aimed at reducing
“the time lapse between an implied consent violation and the
152
imposition of license revocation.”
To this end, a pre-hearing
153
In addition, the thirtylicense revocation scheme was enacted.
day temporary license was replaced with a seven-day temporary
154
license.
The driver still had thirty days to petition for judicial
155
After the driver petitioned for judicial review, a hearing
review.
141. Id.
142. 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, as
discussed in Hamilton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999).
143. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 5a (1980) (repealed 2000).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. 1983).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1982) (repealed 2000); see also Heddan, 336
N.W.2d at 57.
152. Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57.
153. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 4 (2004); Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57.
154. Id. § 169.123, subd. 5a(c)(1); Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57.
155. Id. § 169.123, subd. 5(c)(a); Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 58.
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had to be held at the earliest practicable date, and in no event later
156
However, the
than sixty days after the filing of the petition.
revocation was no longer stayed while the judicial review was
157
pending.
Minnesota’s original pre-hearing revocation scheme was
158
challenged in Heddan v. Dirkswager.
Heddan involved a
consolidated appeal of three drivers who had unsuccessfully
challenged their license revocations and the constitutionality of the
159
new implied consent law in a declaratory judgment action.
The supreme court upheld the revocations and held that the
160
In
pre-hearing revocation scheme did not violate due process.
reaching this determination, the court recognized that “[a] license
161
to drive is an important property interest” and “that some form of
hearing [was] required before an individual is finally deprived of a
162
property interest.”
The court stated “[t]he fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’ . . . . ‘Due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
163
situation demands.’”
The court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s review
164
of Massachusetts’s implied consent law in Mackey v. Montrym and
165
applied the Mathews due process balancing test, weighing three
factors: 1) the private interest affected; 2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation through the procedures used and the probable value of
substitute procedural safeguards; and 3) the government’s interest,
including the function involved and the administrative burdens of
166
additional or substituted procedural requirements.
When evaluating the weight to be accorded to the private
interest, the court considered 1) the duration of the revocation; 2)
the availability of hardship relief; and 3) the availability of prompt

156. Id. § 169.123, subd. 6; Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 58.
157. Id. § 169.123, subd. 5c(c); Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57.
158. See Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 55. Heddan involved the consolidation of three
plaintiffs: Milo Heddan, Paul Lundberg, and Craig Miller. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 63.
161. Id. at 58 (citing Bell, 402 U.S. at 539).
162. Id. at 59 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974)).
163. Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
164. See infra part III.B.
165. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see note 115.
166. Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 59.
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167

post-revocation review.
The supreme court held that, while the
risk of erroneous deprivation was higher under Minnesota law than
the Massachusetts scheme, due to its ability to revoke for test
failures, rather than just refusals, this risk was not so heightened as
168
to destroy the balance of the test.
The court also held that the
public and governmental interests were served through the pre169
hearing suspension scheme.
According to the court, the prehearing suspension scheme provided a means to deter motorists
from driving under the influence, allowed for the swift removal of
impaired drivers from the road and diminished the likelihood that
motorists will seek a hearing, thereby conserving judicial
170
resources.
Finally, the court held that the individual’s interest
171
First, the revocation
was adequately protected in three ways.
172
Second, there was the
period had a relatively short duration.
173
immediate availability of hardship relief.
Finally, the individual
174
could take advantage of prompt post-revocation relief.
175

B. Statutory Revisions and Davis v. Commissioner of Public Safety

In 1992, the legislature amended the implied consent law.
Under the new statute, a first time offender whose license was
revoked under the implied consent statute had to wait fifteen days
176
for a limited license (work permit).
If the driver had a prior
revocation and failed the test, the waiting period for a limited
177
license (work permit) was ninety days.
A driver with a prior
revocation who refused to take the test had a waiting period of 180
178
days.
The 1992 revisions survived a constitutional challenge in 1994
167. Id. at 63.
168. Id. at 62.
169. Id. at 63.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 60.
172. Id. The revocation period was six months for test refusal and ninety days
for test failure. Id.
173. Id. Every individual received a seven-day temporary license and was
immediately eligible for a limited license (work permit). Id.
174. Id. A hearing must be “conducted at the earliest practicable date, and in
any event no later than sixty (60) days following the filing of petition for review.”
Id. The decision from the hearing had to be filed within fifteen days. Id.
175. 517 N.W.2d 901 (1994).
176. See MINN. STAT. § 171.30, subd. 2(a)(1992).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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179

in Davis v. Commissioner of Public Safety.
The Davis court noted
that despite the fact that “limited” or hardship licenses were no
longer immediately available, it was not “prepared at this time to
conclude that the legislation in question violates either federal or
180
state due process guarantees.”
The supreme court noted,
however, that it was “troubled by the lack of immediate hardship
181
relief for first time offenders.”
When issuing its decision, the
Davis court echoed the Supreme Court’s concern about the prehearing revocation scheme, stating that “a court cannot undo an
erroneous revocation,” because in such a case “full retroactive relief
cannot be provided by a court,” and “even a day’s loss of a driver’s
182
license can inflict grave injury upon a person.”
C. Further Statutory Revisions
In 1998, the Minnesota Legislature further revised the implied
consent statute. Prior to 1998, having an alcohol-related revocation
on a driver’s record carried some negative impact. However, under
the 1998 revisions, implied consent revocations are treated as the
functional equivalent of a criminal conviction for every purpose
under the impaired driving code. Where the statute previously
referred to “prior convictions” for purposes of penalty
enhancement and collateral consequences, the statute now refers
183
to “prior qualified impaired-driving incidents.”
That term is
defined to include not only convictions but also “prior impaired184
driving related losses of license.”
The most recent statutory changes were enacted during the
185
2003 Special Session. In that amendment, the legislature deleted
the speedy hearing requirement. The sentence “[t]he hearing
must be held at the earliest practicable date, and in any event no
later than sixty (60) days following the filing of the petition for
186
In
review” was removed from section 169A.53, subdivision 3(a).
179. 517 N.W.2d 901 (1994).
180. Id. at 905. The court also addressed the constitutionality of the implied
consent advisory. Id. at 904. “While [the court was] troubled by the deficiencies
of the current advisory, [they were] unwilling at this time to say that the advisory
violates procedural due process under the Minnesota Constitution.” Id.
181. Id. at 905.
182. Id. (quoting Montrym, 443 U.S. at 11, 21, 30 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
183. MINN. STAT. § 169A.03, subd. 22 (2004).
184. Id. §169A.03, subds. 21–22.
185. See id. § 169A.53, subd. 3.
186. Id. § 169A.53, subd. 3(a).
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addition, the requirement that an order be entered within fourteen
187
days after the implied consent hearing was removed.
V. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: FEDZIUK V.
188
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
A. Facts
Patricia Fedziuk has been prescribed the drug Adderall, a
medication commonly used to treat depression and attention
189
Adderall contains amphetamine
deficit hyperactivity disorder.
190
and is a Schedule II controlled substance.
On October 23, 2003, Ms. Fedziuk was pulled over on the
suspicion of drunk driving. After performing a series of field
sobriety tests, the peace officer administered a preliminary breath
test. This test indicated that there was no alcohol in Ms. Fedziuk’s
breath. Despite this fact, Ms. Fedziuk was arrested and taken to the
police station. At the police station, Ms. Fedziuk consented to a
blood test.
The blood test later revealed the presence of
amphetamine. Based on this finding, the commissioner of public
safety issued a notice and order of revocation for ninety days,
191
beginning April 3, 2004.
Ms. Fedziuk’s attorney requested an administrative and judicial
192
review of the revocation. This request included a copy of a letter
from Ms. Fedziuk’s doctor, stating that Ms. Fedziuk had been
193
prescribed a medication containing amphetamine.
The request
194
Ms.
for administrative rescission of the revocation was denied.
Fedzuik then filed a separate action for declaratory judgment to
have Minnesota’s pre-hearing revocation scheme declared
195
unconstitutional.
Ms. Fedziuk also petitioned for judicial review,
187. Id. § 169A.54, subd. 3(c). The deleted sentence read “[t]he court shall
file its order within fourteen (14) days following the hearing.” Id.
188. Fedziuk v. Commissioner of Public Safety is currently being considered by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Oral arguments were heard on March 7, 2005.
189. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment,
Order Certifying Question to Court of Appeals and Judgment at 2, Fedziuk v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, Dakota County Dist. Court, No. C6-04-7458 (Minn. Nov.
22, 2004) [hereinafter AMENDED ORDER].
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1.
192. Id. at 2.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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196

which was scheduled for hearing on June 1, 2004.
On May 27,
2004, the commissioner of public safety decided to rescind Ms.
197
Fedziuk’s revocation. However, Ms. Fedziuk’s driver’s license was
198
Ms. Fedziuk’s driver’s
listed as “restricted” until June 11, 2004.
199
license was revoked for a total of sixty-nine days.
B. The Argument for Declaring Pre-Hearing Revocations
Unconstitutional
1.

Non-Emergency Situation
200

While Bell v. Burson is most often cited for the proposition
that a driver’s license is an important interest entitled to
constitutional due process protection, the Supreme Court also
stated that “except in emergency situations . . . due process requires
that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here
involved, it must afford ‘notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case’ before the termination
201
becomes effective.”
Emergency situations have been generally defined as situations
where “swift action is necessary to protect public health, safety,
202
revenue, or the integrity of public institutions.” According to the
Supreme Court, an emergency situation existed when mislabeled
203
This emergency justified a
drugs were being sold to the public.
204
pre-hearing seizure of drugs from store shelves.
The immediate
seizure and destruction of diseased poultry was justified as an
emergency because it was necessary to prevent the diseased meat
205
from entering the food chain. Finally, the Supreme Court found
that an emergency justified the imposition of a federally appointed
conservator without the need for a prior hearing in the case of
206
financial abuses by bank management.
196. Id. at 3.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
201. Id. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
202. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 22 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
203. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601 (1950).
204. Id.
205. N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320–21 (1908).
206. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 252–54 (1947).
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The immediate revocation of a driver’s license for testing over
the legal limit or refusing to test is not such an emergency. Indeed,
the Supreme Court conceded that the immediate revocation was
not imposed as an emergency measure, but rather as a sanction to
207
induce drivers to submit to testing.
It would have been difficult
to find otherwise, as Massachusetts did not revoke a license at all if
the driver submitted to the test and failed. Accordingly, drivers
who were demonstrably drunk were not subject to a pre-hearing
revocation. The inebriated driver would be permitted to continue
driving and endangering the public, while the safe—but
uncooperative—driver would be banned.
Minnesota’s system also demonstrates the non-emergency
status of the pre-hearing revocation scheme. In Minnesota, all
drivers, whether they refuse to test or test more than twice the legal
limit, are given a seven-day temporary license before the revocation
208
goes into effect. Since a driver poses the greatest threat to public
safety at or near the time the person is demonstrably impaired, it is
illogical to argue that permitting the person to drive for seven
additional days is designed to protect the public from an
“emergency.”
2.

Changes in the Private Interest
a. Availability of Prompt Post-Revocation Review

During the May 2003 Special Session, the legislature took its
latest swipe at the implied consent statute and removed the
provision requiring “prompt judicial review.” District courts are no
longer required to hold the implied consent hearings within sixty
209
days of the filing for a petition for review.
In addition, district
courts are no longer required to file their orders within fourteen
210
days following the hearing.
b.

Other Factors Not Present at the Time of Heddan and Davis

Another factor that weighs heavily in this analysis is the fact
that the significance of the implied consent blemish has increased

207.
208.
209.
210.

Montrym, 443 U.S. at 20 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subd. 7 (2004).
Id. § 169A.53, subd. 3(a).
Id.
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astronomically since both Heddan and Davis were decided. In 1983
and 1992, an alcohol-related revocation on a driver’s record had a
negative impact. But despite the societal stigma, it was nothing
more than a temporarily forfeited property interest. However, due
to 1998 statutory amendments, an implied consent revocation is
now considered the functional equivalent of a criminal conviction
211
for every purpose under the impaired driving code.
A prior
implied consent revocation can now be used to enhance the level
of a subsequent criminal offense from a misdemeanor to a gross
212
misdemeanor—or even a felony.
This is true even if the driver
was acquitted of the criminal offense that gave rise to the
213
revocation.
Under Minnesota’s current scheme, if a person had
his or her license revoked on three prior occasions within the
previous ten years, but had never been convicted, that person
would be subject to a felony prosecution, just as though they had
been convicted. In addition, prior revocations alone (without
companion convictions) are used as a basis for applying mandatory
214
minimum criminal penalties, for revoking the license plates on
215
every vehicle owned individually or jointly, and as a basis for
216
forfeiting a person’s motor vehicle to the police.
3.

Changes in the Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

The risk of erroneous deprivation element has shifted the
Mathews balance toward a need for greater due process protections
for the driver. Although today’s breath testing instruments are as
reliable as those used in the early 1980s, the interests at stake were
substantially lower at that time.
Another change since Heddan is the availability of affirmative
217
The impaired driving code has added at least three
defenses.
affirmative defenses. First, it is an affirmative defense that the test
218
failure was the result of “post-driving consumption.” Second, test
failure because of the use of prescription drugs is an affirmative

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See infra part IV.C.
MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subd. 3(a) (2004).
Id.
Id. §§ 169A.275, .276.
Id. § 169A.60.
Id. § 169A.63
See id. §§ 169A.53, subd. 3(c), 169A.46, subds. 1,2.
Id. §§ 169A.53, subd. 3(c), 169A.46, subd. 1.
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219

defense.
Finally, there is an affirmative defense available for
220
Although the statute recognizes these
“reasonable refusal.”
defenses, the State acts in spite of them. For example, it is the
practice of the Department of Public Safety to revoke all drivers’
licenses who test positive for a Schedule I or Schedule II controlled
substance without inquiring whether the person had a prescription
221
for the drug involved.
Drivers who have these defenses available
will always suffer an erroneous revocation that will remain in effect
until the driver obtains a judicial hearing on the merits. Because
the requirement that the hearing take place swiftly has been
removed from the statute, it is unlikely that a driver who has one of
these defenses will have an opportunity to present it until they have
suffered their full revocation.
4.

Changes in the State’s Interest Since Heddan

The public and governmental interest has remained the same
since Heddan. Drunk drivers posed a severe threat to the health
and safety of the public in 1983 and continue to do so.
In Heddan, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that approximately
222
33,000 licenses were revoked under the implied consent law in 1981.
According to Department of Public Safety statistics, that number was
32,800 in 1999, 33,329 in 2000, 32,074 in 2001, 31,911 in 2002, and
223
30,991 in 2003.
These numbers indicate that the state’s interest in
promoting public safety has remained basically the same under both the
1981 post-hearing revocation scheme and the current pre-hearing
revocation scheme.
C. The District Court Decision
In addition to requesting administrative and judicial review,
Ms. Fedziuk brought a separate action for “declaratory judgment to
declare Minnesota’s pre-hearing implied consent revocation
224
scheme unconstitutional.”
On November 22, 2004, the district
court entered its Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. § 169A.46, subd. 2.
Id. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c).
Id. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7).
Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57.
Minnesota Department of Public Safety, IMPAIRED DRIVING INCIDENTS ON
RECORD 14 (2003), at www.dps.state.mn.us/OTS/crashdata/ 2003%20Impaired%
20Facts/IDF03GIncidentVer10.pdf (last visited on April 14, 2005).
224. AMENDED ORDER, supra note 189, at 2.
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Order for Judgment, and Order Certifying Question to Court of
Appeals & Judgment.
The Order declares the scheme
unconstitutional; however, it allowed the state to enforce the
225
statute pending the appellate court’s decision.
The Order
certified two questions to the Minnesota Court of Appeals as
important and doubtful:
A. Does Minnesota’s implied consent scheme of prehearing revocation offend a driver’s state and/or federal
constitutional guarantees of due process of law?
B. Is the 1980 version of the implied consent law revived
by the declaration that the current implied consent law is
unconstitutional? If not, what version, if any, is revived if
226
the current law is struck down?
The district court judge attached a memorandum, outlining
227
The Order lays out the numerous
the district court’s reasoning.
statutory revisions since the supreme court considered the pre228
hearing revocation scheme in Heddan.
The Order next applies
the Mathews due process balancing test and weighs the three factors
relevant to the private interest: 1) the duration of the revocation;
2) the availability of hardship relief; and 3) the availability of
229
prompt post-revocation review.
The Order states that “revocation periods have risen
230
dramatically since Heddan.” In 1982, when Heddan was decided, a
driver’s license “would be revoked for a period of ninety (90) days
231
if the driver tested at 0.10 or more.” If the driver refused to take

225. Id. at 4–5.
226. Id. The commissioner of public safety filed a motion for expedited
review. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently took the case from the court
of appeals before the latter court heard oral arguments in the matter. Oral
arguments were heard at the Supreme Court on March 7, 2005.
227. See id. at 8–15. The memorandum first addresses the issues of standing
and mootness. Id. at 7. The district court concluded that the issue was not moot
because it was “capable of repetition but will inevitably escape review.” Id. (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). The court also found that Ms. Fedzuik had
standing even though she had not exhausted other remedies available to her at
law because exhaustion of these remedies is not required under Minnesota’s
declaratory judgment statute. Id. at 8; see MINN. STAT. § 555.01 (2004). The district
court did not address whether there was an emergency situation that justified prehearing revocations.
228. AMENDED ORDER, supra note 189, at 8–11; see discussion supra part IV.
229. AMENDED ORDER, supra note 189, at 8.
230. Id. at 12.
231. Id.
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232

the test, the revocation was 180 days.
Today, the revocation
period for test refusal is one year, double the revocation period of
233
1982.
First time offenders who are under twenty-one years old
234
A driver with a
will have their licenses revoked for six months.
prior revocation within ten years who tests over 0.10 is subject to a
235
180-day revocation.
The only drivers who receive a ninety-day
revocation are first time offenders who test over 0.10 and are older
236
If the driver tests at 0.20 or more, all the
than twenty-one.
237
revocation periods double.
The most recent statutory change was the removal of the
238
The district court
requirement of “prompt judicial review.”
found that
[t]he specific language deleted by the 2003 legislature was
the basis for the Heddan court’s holding that the Mackey v.
Montrym “prompt post-revocation review” element had
been met. The elimination of this critical due process
component, in combination with the elimination of
immediate hardship relief, has eviscerated the heart of the
due process protections found to save the prehearing
239
revocation scheme in Heddan.
Finally, the court discussed the change in the availability of
240
hardship relief.
The district court noted that, in 1982, “a driver
was immediately eligible for ‘hardship relief’ in the form of a
241
The 1992 amendments delayed
limited license (work permit).”
242
this availability for fifteen days for first time offenders.
A driver
243
with a prior offense now has to wait ninety days for a work permit.
A driver with a prior offense who refuses to take an implied consent
test is not eligible for a work permit until 180 days after the
244
revocation period.
These amendments had been approved by

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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245

the supreme court in Davis.
However, the district court noted
that the Davis court had trepidations about the trend of statutory
246
amendments.
The district court judge stated that “[a]lthough
the [Davis] court ultimately upheld the statute, it sent a clear
message to the legislature that it had pushed as far as the
247
constitution would bear.”
VI. CONCLUSION
The license revocations of Heddan’s day no longer resemble
those of today. The Minnesota legislature has dramatically revised
the implied consent statute and removed the very protections that
the Heddan court relied on for the statute’s constitutionality.
Minnesota drivers no longer have the right to prompt review of
their license revocations. In addition, the risk of erroneous
deprivation has increased because of the availability of affirmative
defenses. Finally, the private interests involved in a driver’s license
revocation have increased dramatically because a license revocation
can now be used to enhance criminal charges and penalties. And
yet, while the stakes associated with the revocation have
dramatically increased, the due process protections afforded to
drivers have steadily declined. If the Minnesota legislature wants to
increase the civil penalties of an implied consent revocation to be
identical to a criminal conviction, the procedural due process
protections afforded to drivers must be greater, not less, than the
protections that were afforded when the stakes were lower. The
enhanced private interest is no longer adequately protected and
clearly outweighs the public interest. This enhanced private
interest, combined with the removal of the provision providing
prompt post-revocation review, tips the scales of Mathews and
mandates greater procedural due process protection. Fedzuik
provides the Minnesota Supreme Court with the opportunity to act
on their warnings to the legislature that continued erosion of the
procedural due process provided to drivers in the implied consent
arena will render the statute unconstitutional.

245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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